National Security Space Partnerships within the America First Framework

Cortney Weinbaum (Senior Management Scientist, Senior National Security Researcher, RAND) speaks on “National Security Space Partnerships” at the 2026 Meridian Space Diplomacy Forum: Shared Horizons on Wednesday, March 25, 2026 at Meridian House in Washington, D.C. Photos by Jess Latos.

 

What is emerging in U.S. space policy is not a retreat from international cooperation, but a redefinition of when and how it occurs — one increasingly shaped by speed, autonomy, and selectively structured interdependence. 

This conversation, featuring Todd Harrison (Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute), Clayton Swope (Deputy Director, Aerospace Security Project; Senior Fellow, Defense and Security, CSIS), Cortney Weinbaum (Senior Management Scientist, Senior National Security Researcher, RAND), and Frank Justice (Vice President, Open Diplomacy Programs; Director, Space Diplomacy Initiative, Meridian International Center), highlighted the tension between pace of execution, coalition integration, and the increasing dual-use nature of space systems — particularly where shared capabilities underpin deterrence, early warning, and crisis decision‑making across allied forces. 

Here Were the Top Takeaways from the Program:

1. America First ibeing operationalized as speed and autonomy, not isolation  

A key theme was that “America First does not mean America alone,” but in practice it is being implemented as a strategy of moving forward quickly on U.S. priorities, with or without allied alignment at the outset. Harrison noted that the U.S. can “push ahead with a lot of these things on its own,” given its scale advantage in funding and capability.  

Under this model, partnership is often additive rather than foundational, with allies integrated after core systems are already in motion. Programs such as Golden Dome were cited as examples where allied participation may come later as a “bolt-on” rather than a co-designed architecture. The implication is that timing advantage and unilateral capacity are prioritized, even in domains that ultimately require coalition integration. 

2. Export controls and institutional risk aversion remain the core friction point 

While policy reforms have eased formal restrictions, participants agreed that export controls and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) continue to shape behavior in ways that extend beyond regulation. Even when technically permissible, organizations often avoid engagement due to perceived legal and compliance risk.  

Weinbaum reinforced that regulatory change does not immediately translate into behavioral change, particularly when uncertainty remains about what is allowed. The result is a system where compliance culture, not just formal rules, limits collaboration. This has a disproportionate impact on smaller firms, which lack the resources to navigate complex approval pathways. 

3. Integration under pressurereal-time coherence is key 

The most significant constraint is no longer whether allies cooperate, but whether they can operate within the same decision-speed environment under extreme time compression. Swope highlighted, “it's an integration challenge, but also how do we make sense of all that information at tactically relevant speeds?”  

Modern missile defense and space-enabled sensing architectures are generating vast streams of data that must be fused, interpreted, and acted upon in near real time. This shifts the bottleneck from access to information toward processing speed and command coherence across systems. In this environment, deterrence depends less on who owns the sensors and more on who can integrate and act on data fastest. The strategic implication is that alliance effectiveness will continue to be defined by shared operational tempo rather than shared platforms. 

4. Selective integration, not full interdependence 

Even as capabilities become more networked, full operational integration across allies remains unlikely due to sovereignty concerns and security segmentation requirements. Instead, what is emerging is a hybrid model: tightly coupled data environments paired with deliberately segmented execution authorities. Missile warning and tracking systems may be globally distributed, but interception and kinetic response will remain more nationally controlled. This creates a structurally asymmetric alliance system where information is shared broadly, but action authority is not. The result is not fragmentation, but managed interdependence  high connectivity paired with carefully bounded control. 

5. Cooperatioendures only where objectives and value align 

As Harrison observed, “international cooperation works best and international alignment endures when the nations involved have shared objectives and cooperation is mutually beneficial.” This principle ultimately functions as the governing logic behind the entire trajectory of space security integration described above. As systems become faster, more distributed, and more tightly controlled, engagement is increasingly not assumed but earned through alignment of strategic objectives and clear mutual benefit. The result is a more conditional form of partnership  durable where interests converge and limited where they do not.

Project summary

National Security Space Partnerships within the America First Framework | March 2026
Program Areas: Technology, Innovation, & Space
032526 Meridian 0227
Secret Link